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I. INTRODUCTION
The public domain may be defined as that body of literary and
artistic works (or other information) that is not subject to any
copyright (or other intellectual property right), and which therefore
may be freely used by any member of the general public.1 This concept
is implicit in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
which stipulates that patents and copyrights may only be granted “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” and only “for limited
Times.”2 The “limited Times” restriction implies that patents and
copyrights must expire at some point,3 and the “Progress” limitation
implies that patents and copyright can only be granted for new works,
not for pre-existing ones.4 Thus, once a previously granted copyright
on a work has expired, the general public has a “federal right to copy
and to use” the work without attribution.5
Traditionally, the copyright public domain has been considered
irrevocable. When a work enters the public domain, even if it failed to
obtain any copyright protection in the first place, it remains in the
public domain.6 However, Congress breached this traditional
limitation when it enacted section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act in 1994.7 (Section 514 is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A.)
Section 514 “restored” copyright protection in the United States for all
1.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (9th ed. 2009); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S
DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 354 (2d ed. 1995). For attempts at a more
detailed definition and description of the public domain, see Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975–77 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain,
28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217–22 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public
Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 783–813 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public
Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149–52 (2003).
2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3.
Cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(Congress may not “create[] a species of perpetual patent [or] copyright”).
4.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (“Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which
add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ ”).
5.
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34.
6.
Ochoa, supra note 1, at 234 & nn.132–33, 262–64, 320–22 (collecting cases); see also
WILLIAM B. HALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 213, 13 C.J.
1075 (1917) (“The omission of the notice by or with the consent of the copyright proprietor
destroys the copyright and puts the work irrevocably in the public domain.”). Trademark law
represents a limited exception to this principle, allowing business owners to appropriate words
and symbols for use as source identifiers for their goods and services, thereby removing certain
uses of those words and symbols from the public domain. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 264–66.
7.
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(2006)).

Ochoa__Page.doc (Do Not Delete)

2011]

AN INTRODUCTION TO GOLAN V. HOLDER

10/3/11 2:39 PM

125

works of foreign origin that were not yet in the public domain in their
source countries, but that were in the public domain in the United
States for various specified reasons.8 By removing an entire body of
works from the public domain, Congress challenged the idea that the
Patent and Copyright Clause implicitly limits Congress’s power to
grant patents and copyrights over material that previously was in the
public domain and could be freely used by anyone.
In Golan v. Holder,9 the Supreme Court will consider whether
Congress’s action in removing thousands of foreign works from the
public domain violates either the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution or the First Amendment.10 Golan, however, is not an
isolated case; it is one of four test cases that were initially filed by law
professor Lawrence Lessig to challenge various aspects of a decadelong expansion of copyright—and corresponding diminution of the
public domain—enacted by Congress in the 1990s.11 Thus, in order to
understand the significance of Golan, it is helpful to revisit the major
congressional actions that led to those test cases, and to consider how
the public domain has been harmed by those actions.
Part II of this Essay describes the international copyright
considerations that motivated Congress to act, while Part III reviews
Congress’s revisions to copyright law and the effect of those revisions
on the public domain. Part IV examines the court challenges brought
against those revisions. Part V discusses the importance of Golan and
the actual and potential impact it will have on the public domain.
Other essays in this Roundtable will discuss the merits of the case.
II. BACKGROUND: THE BERNE CONVENTION
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works is the major international treaty concerning copyright
protection for works of foreign nationals.12 The United States,
however, did not join the Berne Convention for more than a century
after it was signed in 1886,13 because our approach to copyright
8.
For details of copyright restoration, see infra Part V.A.
9.
609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
10. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2010).
11. See infra Part III (congressional expansion of copyright); infra notes 63–76 and
accompanying text (test cases).
12. Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986),
available at www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
13. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES,
LAW, AND PRACTICE § 3.1.2.1, at 37–38 (2d ed. 2010) ("The United States of America was the
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protection was fundamentally different from that of the rest of the
world. Whereas most nations consider copyright to be a natural right
of the author, which arises automatically as a result of the act of
authorship,14 the United States has traditionally viewed copyright
primarily as a utilitarian law, designed as an incentive for the
creation and distribution of new works of authorship.15 As a result,
while the Berne Convention prohibits conditioning copyright
protection on any formalities,16 the United States previously required
authors to comply with various formalities in order to obtain copyright
protection.17 For example, under the 1909 Copyright Act, authors had
to publish their works with proper copyright notice to obtain a federal
statutory copyright.18 If a work was published without proper notice,
the author was deemed to have dedicated the work to the public
domain.19 The United States also required authors to register their
works in order to enforce their copyrights by an infringement suit.20
Another fundamental difference between the United States and Berne
parties was the question of duration. While the Berne Convention
single, commercially most important country to remain outside the Berne Union for its entire
first century. . . . The United States finally adhered to the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989.").
14. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 27(2) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to the protections of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author.”); GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 1.2, at 6–7.
15. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(2) (“The enjoyment and the exercise of
these rights shall not be subject to any formality . . . .”).
17. See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 3.1.2.1, at 38 ("Political pressure to
retain formalities . . . , which were prohibited since 1908 by the Berlin Text [of the Berne
Convention], was one reason the United States declined to join Berne."). Formalities serve a
number of purposes in a utilitarian-based system of copyright, including recording and
preserving data concerning ownership and duration, and requiring authors and artists to
distinguish those works for which copyright protection is desired from those for which it is not.
See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 500–39 (2004).
18. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 10 in
1947, repealed 1978).
19. See, e.g., Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 212 F. 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1914)
(“[P]ublication without such notice amounts to a dedication to the public sufficient to defeat all
subsequent efforts at copyright protection.”), aff’d on other grounds, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1914);
HALE, supra note 6, § 213, at 1075.
20. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 13 in
1947, repealed 1978) (“No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright
in any work until the provisions of this Act with respect to the deposit of copies and registration
of such work shall have been complied with.”).
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required that member nations protect works for the life of the author
and fifty years after the author’s death,21 under the 1909 Act the
United States provided only a fixed term of twenty-eight years of
copyright protection, which could be renewed once for another twentyeight years if the author complied with the formality of registering the
copyright in the renewal term.22
The Copyright Act of 197623 removed some of the objections to
Berne membership by automatically granting protection from creation
to new works of authorship for a term of life of the author plus fifty
years.24 However, the United States still could not join the Berne
Convention because the 1976 Act continued to require the formalities
of notice when a work was published and registration as a condition of
judicial enforcement.25 In addition, the United States retained the
formality of renewal for works already published or registered under
the 1909 Act.26
Because the United States was (and is) the world’s largest
exporter of copyrighted works, it was in the national interest to
encourage other nations to grant broad copyright protection to U.S.
works. Such protection, however, could only effectively be
accomplished by joining the Berne Convention.27 Thus, in 1988
Congress enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act
(“BCIA”).28 The BCIA made copyright notice optional rather than

21. See Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(1). The life-plus-fifty term was
recommended in the 1908 Berlin text of the Berne Convention and became mandatory in the
1948 Brussels text. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under
the 1909 Copyright Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 290 & nn.26–27
(2010).
22. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 24 in
1947, repealed 1978).
23. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805). The
Act took effect January 1, 1978. Id. § 102, 90 Stat. at 2598–99.
24. Id. § 302(a), 90 Stat. at 2572.
25. See id. §§ 401–06, 90 Stat. at 2576–79 (notice); id. §§ 408–12, 90 Stat. at 2580–83
(registration).
26. See id. § 304(a), 90 Stat. at 2573–74; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 139 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5755 (“A great many of the present [renewal] expectancies in these
[works] are the subject of existing contracts, and it would be unfair and immensely confusing to
cut off or alter these interests. Renewal registration will be required during the 28th year of the
copyright but the length of the renewal term will be increased from 28 to 47 years.”).
27. See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2–5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707–10
(stating the reasons for joining the Berne Convention).
28. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). The BCIA took effect March 1, 1989. Id. §
13, 102 Stat. at 2861; World Intellectual Prop. Org., Berne Notification No. 121, Accession by the
United
States
of
America,
November
17,
1988,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_121.html (listing date of entry
into force of March 1, 1989).
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mandatory,29 and it retained the formality of registration as a
condition of filing suit only for domestic works.30 For foreign works, an
infringement suit can now be filed without the formality of
registration,31 although registration was (and is) still required to
obtain the additional remedies of statutory damages and recovery of
attorney’s fees.32
Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires that new member
nations provide retroactive protection to other Berne parties’ works
“which, at the moment of [the Convention’s] coming into force, have
not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through
the expiry of the term of protection.”33 This provision is subject to two
limitations. First, if “through the expiry of the term of protection
which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public
domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not
be protected anew.”34 Second, in the absence of a special agreement on
retroactive protection, each country may determine for itself “the
conditions of application of this principle.”35
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989,
however, it took no action to implement Article 18. Moreover,
Congress made it abundantly clear that it did not consider the Berne
Convention to be self-executing, and that the Convention could be
enforced only to the extent that it had been implemented in domestic
law.36 Thus, despite Article 18, works of foreign origin that had

29. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 2853, 2857–58 (1988) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 401–406 (2006)).
30. The original statutory phrase was “[e]xcept for actions for infringement of copyright in
Berne Convention works whose country of origin is not the United States.” Id. § 9(b)(1)(B), 102
Stat. at 2859 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006)).
31. The current statutory phrase is “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). A “United States work” is defined
as a work first published in the United States or simultaneously published in the United States
and in another country, or an unpublished work whose authors are all nationals, domiciliaries,
or habitual residents of the United States. Id. § 101.
32. Id. § 412.
33. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 18(1).
34. Id. art. 18(2).
35. Id. art. 18(3).
36. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2006) (“No right or interest in a work eligible for protection
under this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for
protection under this title . . . shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon,
the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto.”); Pub. L.
No. 100-568, § 2, 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (1988) (“The obligations of the United States under the
Berne Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate domestic law. . . . The
amendments made by this Act . . . satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the
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previously entered the public domain in the United States remained
there for the time being.37
III. CONGRESS’S ASSAULT ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
In the 1990s, Congress enacted four major pieces of legislation
that had the effect of drastically reducing the scope of the public
domain.
First, in 1992, Congress enacted the Copyright Renewal Act.38
This Act applied only to works that had been published or registered
under the 1909 Act between January 1, 1964, and December 31,
1977.39 All such works were still subject to the requirement that the
copyright be renewed after the initial twenty-eight-year term in order
to receive an additional term of protection.40 Historically, only about
ten to fifteen percent of all eligible works were renewed; the remaining
eighty-five to ninety percent entered the public domain after the
expiration of the first twenty-eight years of copyright protection.41 The
Act, however, made copyright renewal automatic, so that even if no
author or other copyright claimant came forward to register the work,
the renewal term automatically vested anyway.42 By changing
Berne Convention and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that
purpose.”); id. § 3(a), 102 Stat. at 2853 (“The provisions of the Berne Convention . . . shall be
given effect under title 17, as amended by this Act, and . . . shall not be enforceable in any action
brought pursuant to the provisions of the Berne Convention itself.”).
37. Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 12, 102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988) (“Title 17 . . . as amended by this
Act, does not provide copyright protection for any work that is in the public domain in the United
States.”).
38. Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).
39. Id. § 102(g)(2).
40. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2573. The 1976
Act had extended the second term from twenty-eight years to forty-seven years, resulting in a
maximum term of protection of seventy-five years from first publication or registration. Id; see
also Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical
Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 42–43 (2001) (explaining the term extension in the
1976 Act).
41. See BARBARA A. RINGER, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 31: RENEWAL OF
COPYRIGHT app. C at 222 (Comm. Print 1961) (prepared for the S. Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (finding that for works first
published between 1923 and 1932, for which renewal was to be made between 1950 and 1959,
the percentage of renewals varied between 9.85% (in 1953) to 14.70% (in 1959)). The data from
1959 showed that of works registered in 1931–32, thirty-five percent of musical compositions
(Class E) and seventy-four percent of motion pictures (Class L) were renewed, but only seven
percent of books (Class A) and only eleven percent of periodicals (Class B) were renewed. Id. at
220–21.
42. See Pub. L. No. 102-307, § 102(a), 106 Stat. 264, 265 (1992) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2006)) (providing for the vesting of a renewal term both when an
application for extension has been made and when such application has not been made by the
expiration of the initial copyright term).

Ochoa__Page.doc (Do Not Delete)

130

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

10/3/11 2:39 PM

[Vol. 64:123

copyright renewal from an “opt-in” system to an “opt-out” system,
Congress effectively deprived the public domain of the eighty-five to
ninety percent of works that would otherwise have entered the pubic
domain between 1993 and 2006 under the renewal provisions of the
1976 Act.43 Instead, all of those works would remain under copyright
until at least between 2040 and 2053.44
Second, in 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (“URAA”).45 The purpose of the URAA was to
implement the changes made by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS Agreement”),
which was one of the annexes to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).46 The TRIPS Agreement made all
of the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention (except for
Article 6bis, on moral rights) enforceable between nations under the
dispute-resolution mechanism of the WTO.47 Because Article 18 of the
Berne Convention would now be enforceable against the United
States, the United States had to make some effort to comply with
Article 18. However, where other nations chose only minimal
compliance with Article 18, by enacting permanent protection for socalled “reliance parties” (persons or entities that had relied on the
public domain status of the works in some way),48 Congress enacted

43. Because “[a]ll terms of copyright . . . run to the end of the calendar year in which they
would otherwise expire,” 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2006), works published or registered in 1964 had their
first twenty-eight-year term run until December 31, 1992, and would have entered the public
domain on January 1, 1993, if not renewed. Works published or registered in 1977 had their first
twenty-eight-year term run until December 31, 2005, and would have entered the public domain
on January 1, 2006, if not renewed.
44. For works published or registered in 1964, seventy-five years of copyright protection
would endure until December 31, 2039, and the work would enter the public domain on January
1, 2040. For works published or registered in 1977, seventy-five years of copyright protection
would endure until December 31, 2052, and the work would enter the public domain on January
1, 2053. These periods were extended again by twenty years in 1998. See infra notes 55–58 and
accompanying text.
45. Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (copyright restoration provisions codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)).
46. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
47. Id. arts. 9(1), 64.
48. See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D. Colo. 2009) (citing “temporally
permanent” accommodations provided by Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia,
and New Zealand), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the U.K. law), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
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far more sweeping protection. Effective January 1, 1996,49 section 514
of the URAA automatically restored copyright protection to all works
of foreign origin that were not yet in the public domain in their source
countries, but that were in the public domain in the Untied States for
specified reasons.50 As for reliance parties, Congress required that
they be given either actual or constructive notice of the restoration.51
Once notice was given, reliance parties had one year to sell off any
existing inventory of copies of restored works, after which any further
exploitation would be infringing.52 The result was that thousands of
foreign works that had been in the public domain in the United States
were placed under copyright protection for the same terms that they
would have received if they had been eligible for copyright protection
and had complied with all the necessary formalities required by U.S.
law.53
Third, in 1998 Congress enacted two major pieces of legislation:
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)54 and the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”).55 While the DMCA did not
directly affect the scope of the public domain,56 the CTEA extended the
terms of all existing and future copyrights by twenty years,57 resulting
in a near-moratorium on new works entering the public domain until
2019.58

49. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (2006) (defining the “date of restoration” of a restored
copyright as January 1, 1996, for works with a source country that adheres to the Berne
Convention or that was a WTO member country on such date).
50. Id. § 104A(a)(1)(A), (h)(6). For details concerning copyright restoration, including the
specified reasons, see infra Part V.A.
51. Id. § 104A(c).
52. Id. §§ 104A(d)(2), 109(a). In order to protect the movie industry, however, Congress
provided that a reliance party could continue to exploit any existing derivative works that were
based on now-restored works, upon payment of “reasonable compensation.” Id. § 104A(d)(3).
53. See id. § 104A(a)(1)(B).
54. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.).
55. Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 108, 203, 301–04 (2006)).
56. However, the DMCA made it more difficult for consumers and users to gain access to
public domain works distributed only in encrypted formats by prohibiting the distribution of
decryption devices and software. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2006)).
57. Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 302–04). See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 44–46.
58. Ochoa, supra note 40, at 46. The only works that will enter the public domain before
2019 are works by authors who died more than seventy years before the current year that were
unpublished and not registered on January 1, 1978, and that remained unpublished on
December 31, 2002. See 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (providing duration of copyright for works created but
not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978).
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The net result of these congressional actions on the public
domain was dramatic. Had the 1909 Act remained the law, all works
published or registered before 1955 would now be in the public
domain.59 Even under the 1976 Act as enacted, all works published or
registered before 1936 would now be in the public domain,60 along
with the vast majority of works published or registered between 1936
and 1977.61 Many works of foreign origin would be in the public
domain for failure to comply with formalities, and all works of foreign
origin published before the United States had copyright treaty
relations with the country of origin would be in the public domain.62
Instead, the public domain is now limited to works published or
registered before January 1, 1923, and those domestic works
published or registered between 1923 and 1963 that were not
renewed. All domestic works published or registered in 1923 or later
and properly renewed, all domestic works published or registered in
1964 or later, and all works of foreign origin published or registered in
1923 or later are currently under copyright in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Lessig’s first test case was Eldred v. Reno, which challenged
the CTEA on the ground that it violated both the First Amendment
and the Patent and Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.63 Each
of the plaintiffs64 alleged it was harmed because it had planned to
59. Under the 1909 Act, the maximum term of copyright was fifty-six years from first
publication, so any works published in 1954 would have remained under copyright until 2010
and would have entered the public domain on January 1, 2011. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
60. Under the 1976 Act as enacted, the maximum term of copyright for works published
before 1978 was seventy-five years from first publication, so any works published in 1935 would
have remained under copyright until December 31, 2010, and would have entered the public
domain on January 1, 2011. See supra note 40.
61. Under the 1976 Act as enacted, works published before 1978 still had to be renewed. If
not renewed, they entered the public domain at the end of their first twenty-eight-year term.
Historically, only about ten to fifteen percent of all eligible works were renewed. See supra note
41.
62. See infra Part V.A.
63. Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 58–66, 76–80, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 1999) (No. 99-CV-00065), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/eldredvreno/
cyber/complaint_amd2.html. Another count alleged that that the CTEA violated the public trust
doctrine, id. ¶¶ 69–73, but this theory was rejected by the district court and was not appealed.
For an analysis of the public trust theory, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 113–16.
64. Eric Eldred is an individual who posts public domain literary works on the Internet
under the name the Eldritch Press. He was later joined by three publishers of public domain
works: Dover Publications, Inc., Higginson Book Co. (genealogy & history), and Tri-Horn
International (golf); three users of public domain sheet music: Jill A. Crandall (church choir
director), Luck’s Music Library (retailer) and Edwin F. Kalmus & Co. (publisher); two users of
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reprint, restore, perform, or use works that would have entered the
public domain but for the CTEA.65 On October 28, 1999, the district
court granted the Government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
and the judgment was affirmed by a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit
on February 16, 2001.66 After new Attorney General John Ashcroft
succeeded Janet Reno, the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing was
rejected on July 13, 2001.67
Following the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Eldred, Lessig filed two
more test cases, each challenging both the CTEA and section 514 of
the URAA on the grounds that they violated the Patent and Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment. Golan v. Ashcroft was filed on
September 19, 2001,68 and Luck’s Music Library v. Ashcroft was filed
on October 29, 2001.69 The plaintiffs in each case alleged that they
were affected by copyright restoration when various works of foreign
origin were removed from the public domain.70
Before the district courts could act, however, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Eldred v. Ashcroft.71 As a result, both
district courts stayed the actions pending the outcome of Eldred. On
January 15, 2003, the Supreme Court held, 7–2, that the CTEA did
not violate either the Patent and Copyright Clause or the First
public domain movies: American Film Heritage Association (non-profit association devoted to
film preservation) and Moviecraft, Inc. (commercial film archive); and Copyright’s Commons, a
non-profit public domain advocacy organization founded by Lessig (later renamed Creative
Commons). Second Amended Complaint, supra note 63, ¶¶ 1–11; CREATIVE COMMONS,
http://creativecommons.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); ELDRITCH PRESS, www.eldritchpress.org
(last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
65. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 63, ¶¶ 27–55.
66. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir.
2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). For an analysis of the district
court’s opinion, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 109–16. For an analysis of the circuit court opinion,
see id. at 116–20.
67. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For an analysis of the opinion
denying rehearing, see Ochoa, supra note 40, at 120–24.
68. Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 01-B-1854),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/complaint.pdf. The plaintiffs in
Golan were Lawrence Golan, a music professor at the University of Denver and conductor of the
Portland (Maine) Ballet Orchestra and the Atlantic Chamber Orchestra; Richard Kapp,
conductor and founder of the Philharmonia Virtuosi, and his recording company, S.A. Publishing
Co. (d/b/a ESS.A.Y Recordings); the Symphony of the Canyons, a community orchestra in Utah;
Ron Hall, d/b/a Festival Films; and John McDonough, d/b/a Timeless Video Alternatives
International. Id. ¶¶ 6–11.
69. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The lead
plaintiff in Luck’s Music Library was a retailer of public domain music and was joined by
Moviecraft, Inc., a commercial film archive. 321 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11.
70. Luck’s, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 110–11; Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 78–90.
71. 534 U.S. 1126 (2002).
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Amendment.72 In rejecting the Patent and Copyright Clause
challenge, the Court noted that the plaintiffs did not challenge the
absolute duration of the copyright term, but only contended that
whatever period Congress selected could not be extended
retroactively.73 In rejecting the First Amendment challenge, the Court
remarked that “when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment
scrutiny is unnecessary.”74
In the wake of Eldred, Lessig filed a fourth test case, Kahle v.
Ashcroft, which attempted to capitalize on the Supreme Court’s
remarks by arguing that Congress had changed the “traditional
contours of copyright protection” when it changed copyright from an
“opt-in” system requiring renewal to an “opt-out” system of automatic
renewal, and that the life-plus-seventy-year term itself violated the
“limited Times” provision of the Patent and Copyright Clause.75 The
district court summarily dismissed the case based on Eldred, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.76
Meanwhile, in the two pending cases concerning copyright
restoration, the court in Golan acted first, denying the Government’s
motion to dismiss on March 16, 2004.77 Three months later, the
district court in Luck’s Music Library granted the Government’s
motion to dismiss on the grounds that Congress had on three previous
occasions removed some works from the public domain,78 and that the
72. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
73. Id. at 193.
74. Id. at 221.
75. Complaint at 35–52, 92–101, Kahle v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24090 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 19, 2004) (No. C-04-1127). The plaintiffs were Brewster Kahle, founder and chairman of the
Internet Archive, a non-profit corporation that makes public domain works available on the
Internet; and Richard Prelinger, President of Prelinger Associates, Inc., which owns and operates
the Prelinger Archive, an extensive collection of advertising, educational, industrial, and
amateur films. Id. ¶¶ 1–4. Plaintiffs alleged that they desired to make “orphan” works (works for
whom no copyright owner can be located) available on the Internet, but were deterred by the
threat of criminal copyright infringement. Id. ¶¶ 75–78.
76. Kahle v. Ashcroft, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1888 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004), aff’d sub nom.
Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
77. Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221 (D. Colo. 2004), motion for summary
judgment granted sub nom. Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1808, 1809 (D. Colo. Apr.
20, 2005), rev’d in part, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007), on remand sub nom. Golan v.
Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076, 1094 (10th Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
78. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113–16 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d
sub nom. Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The
Copyright Act of 1790 allowed previously published works to qualify for copyright upon
compliance with the requisite formalities; and following World Wars I and II, Congress allowed
foreign copyright owners who were unable to comply with the requisite formalities during the
war a grace period to do so after the cessation of hostilities. 321 F. Supp. 2d at 113–16. Whether
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“traditional contours of copyright protection” were limited to the ideaexpression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.79 The plaintiffs
appealed only the Patent and Copyright Clause portion of the ruling,
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed on May 24, 2005.80
The district court in Golan fell into line, granting the
Government’s motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2005, on the
grounds that Congress had previously restored some works from the
public domain, and that the private enforcement of copyrights does not
implicate the First Amendment.81 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the ruling that the Patent and Copyright Clause does not
prohibit Congress from removing copyrights from the public domain;
but with regard to the First Amendment, it held that “the traditional
contours of copyright protection include the principle that works in the
public domain remain there . . . .”82 The court acknowledged that “the
history of the 1790 [Copyright] Act could be highly informative of the
Framers’ views,” but it concluded that “the answer to the question of
whether Congress thought it was removing works from the public
domain [in 1790] is probably not just unclear but also unknowable.”83
It also found that two wartime acts allowing foreign copyright owners
a grace period to comply with the required formalities after the
cessation of hostilities “were, at most, a brief and limited departure
from a practice of guarding the public domain.”84 The court further
held that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment interests were implicated by
the Government’s action in restoring copyrights, and that neither the
idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use doctrine, nor the URAA itself
were adequate to protect the First Amendment interests at stake.85 It
therefore remanded the case with instructions to determine whether
Congress believed in 1790 that previously published works were in the public domain or not
remains a hotly debated question. See Brief of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui and Tyler T. Ochoa as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Golan v. Holder, No. 10-545 (U.S. June 17, 2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_Brief_
Updates/10-545_petitioneramcu2scholars.authcheckdam.pdf.
79. Luck’s v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19.
80. Luck’s v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d at 1265–66.
81. Golan v. Gonzales, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. The court also held that the URAA
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1821–22. The plaintiffs
did not appeal this portion of the district court’s opinion.
82. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186–89 (10th Cir. 2007), on remand sub nom. Golan
v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
83. Id. at 1191.
84. Id. at 1192; see also id. (“The fact that the legislation was passed in response to the
exigencies of a world war suggests that Congress felt compelled to depart from its normal
practice of preserving the public domain.”); supra note 78 (discussing postwar grace periods).
85. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d at 1192–96.
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the URAA was content-based or content-neutral, and to apply the
appropriate level of scrutiny to the legislation.86
On remand, the parties agreed that the URAA was a contentneutral law, and that it should be upheld “if it advances important
governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests.”87 The Government proffered three interests
allegedly served by section 514. The first, compliance with Article 18
of the Berne Convention, was conceded to be an important interest,88
but the plaintiffs claimed that they were “reliance parties”89 and that
Article 18(3) gave member nations the discretion to permanently
exempt reliance parties, as several other nations had done.90 The
district court agreed, and held that section 514 was “substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest,”91
becoming the first court ever to hold that a copyright law violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The second governmental interest offered was the protection of
American authors abroad. The Government argued that enactment of
section 514 would encourage other countries to reciprocate and to
provide broad protection to American authors, despite the discretion
afforded those countries by Article 18(3) of the Berne Convention.92
The court, however, found that there was “no evidence showing how
suppression of reliance parties’ First Amendment rights will lead to
suppression of reliance parties’ rights in foreign nations, or how such
suppression will provide a ‘direct and material’ benefit to United
States authors.”93 Instead, the court credited testimony made before
Congress suggesting that other nations were unlikely to follow the
United States’ lead.94 Third, the Government argued that restoration
of foreign authors’ copyrights was itself equitable and an important
governmental interest. The court rejected this argument, noting that
section 514 protects only foreign authors, and that the argument was

86. Id. at 1196–97.
87. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (Turner II)), rev’d on other grounds, 609 F.3d 1076
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
88. Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1172.
89. Defined as “those persons with a vested interest in previously public-domain works.”
Id. at 1174.
90. Id. (citing Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand).
91. Id. at 1175.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1176.
94. Id.
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therefore inconsistent with the argument that the statute would result
in greater copyright protection for American authors.95
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, focusing only on the
second asserted interest.96 It held that obtaining greater copyright
protection for American authors in other countries was an important
government interest, and that Congress was entitled to credit
“testimony from a number of witnesses that the United States’
position on the scope of copyright restoration . . . was critical to the
United States’ ability to obtain similar protections for American
copyright holders” in future negotiations with foreign countries.97 It
also held that even if “the government could have complied with the
minimal obligations of the Berne Convention and granted stronger
protections for American reliance parties,”98 that fact was immaterial
for two reasons: (1) Congress legitimately could have sought greater
copyright protection for American authors abroad than the Berne
Convention required, which could only be achieved by granting
greater copyright protection to foreign authors here;99 and (2)
intermediate scrutiny did not require that the Government adopt the
least restrictive means of advancing its interest.100 It also held that in
any event, “[t]he United Kingdom model is not substantially less
restrictive of speech than” section 514.101 It therefore concluded that
section 514 did not violate the First Amendment.102
Nine months later, on March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, with

95. Id. at 1177.
96. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083–84 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S.
Ct. 1600 (2011).
97. Id. at 1084–86, 1088. The court noted the existence of conflicting testimony that
predicted other countries would not follow the United States’ example, but it held that Congress
was entitled to weigh the conflicting evidence, and that “in areas that involve predictions of
foreign relations and diplomacy, where empirical data will rarely be available, . . . considerable
deference is owed to Congress and the Executive.” Id. at 1089.
98. Id. at 1091.
99. Id. at 1091–92.
100. Id. at 1092.
101. Id. at 1093. Section 514 gives U.S. reliance parties one year to sell off existing
inventory after being placed on actual or constructive notice of restoration, and it allows reliance
parties who created derivative works to continue to exploit those works upon payment of
reasonable compensation to the copyright owner. Id. Under the U.K. legislation, reliance parties
may continue using the restored work, including any derivative works, unless the copyright
owner “buys out” the reliance party by paying compensation. Id.
102. Id. at 1094. The court also rejected the Petitioner’s cross-appeal concerning the Patent
and Copyright Clause, on the ground that the previous Tenth Circuit opinion in Golan was the
law of the case. Id. at 1094–95.
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Justice Kagan recusing herself because of her previous participation
in the case.103 The questions presented to the Supreme Court are:
(1) Does the Progress Clause [i.e., the Patent and Copyright
Clause] of the United States Constitution prohibit Congress from
taking works out of the public domain?
(2) Does section 514 violate the First Amendment of the
Constitution?104
V. GOLAN’S EFFECT ON AND IMPORTANCE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The immediate effect of Golan will be to decide whether
thousands of foreign works whose copyrights were “restored” in 1996
will remain under copyright, or whether they will be returned to the
public domain. Its future implications, however, will depend on the
decision and reasoning of the Supreme Court.
A. Copyright Restoration
To understand the immediate effect of Golan, it is necessary to
take a closer look at section 514 and how it actually operates. Section
514 of the URAA was codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A. Effective January
1, 1996,105 § 104A “restored” copyright protection to foreign works that
were not in the public domain in their country of origin, but that were
in the public domain in the United States for one of three specified
reasons: (1) “noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by
United States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of
proper notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing
requirements”; (2) “lack of subject matter protection in the case of
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972”; and (3) “lack of
national eligibility.”106 Thus, there are three categories of foreign
works that had their copyrights restored on January 1, 1996, the first
category of which is further divided into three subcategories.
The first category consists of works from all eligible countries107
that were in the public domain in the United States for lack of
renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to meet the requirements of
the manufacturing clause, and that were still under copyright in their

103. Golan v. Holder, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011).
104. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Golan, No. 10-545 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2010).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (2006).
106. Id. § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6).
107. Countries that are members of the Berne Convention, the World Trade Organization,
or certain other copyright treaties. Id. § 104A(h)(3) (defining “eligible country”).
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source countries on January 1, 1996.108 Since copyright protection is
automatic in Berne countries, and subsists for either the life of the
author plus seventy years (in the European Union and other
countries)109 or the life of the author plus fifty years (in other Berne
nations),110 the vast majority of foreign works published in 1923 or
later were still under copyright in their source countries and were
therefore eligible for restoration.
The first subcategory consists of works from all eligible
countries that were published in the United States between January
1, 1923, and December 31, 1963, and that were not renewed. Because
only about ten to fifteen percent of all works published during this
period were renewed, this subcategory includes tens of thousands of
works, including such famous works as Carl Dreyer’s The Passion of
Joan of Arc, Fritz Lang’s Metropolis and M, Alfred Hitchcock’s
Blackmail, The Lady Vanishes and The 39 Steps, Jean Renoir’s The
Grand Illusion and The Rules of the Game, The Blue Angel (starring
Marlene Dietrich), The Private Life of Don Juan (starring Douglas
Fairbanks), The Private Life of Henry VIII (starring Charles
Laughton), Fire Over England (starring Laurence Olivier and Vivien
Leigh), and The Third Man (featuring Orson Welles).111
The second subcategory consists of works from all eligible
countries that were published in the United States without proper
notice between January 1, 1923, and December 31, 1977,112 or
published anywhere in the world without proper notice between
January 1, 1978, and February 28, 1989, the day before the United
States joined the Berne Convention.113 Works in this subcategory
include The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings trilogy by J.R.R.
Tolkien, writings by Joseph Conrad, George Orwell, H.G. Wells, and
108. Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(i).
109. See Council Directive 2006/116 of 12 December 2006 on the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1(1), 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 13 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:372:0012:0018:EN:PDF.
110. Berne Convention, supra note 12, art. 7(1).
111. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 82–83, 88; Copyright Restoration and Foreign
Works: Be Careful, PUBLIC DOMAIN SHERPA, http://www.publicdomainsherpa.com/copyrightrestoration.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).
112. After initial publication with notice, the 1909 Act required notice on “each copy thereof
published or offered for sale in the United States by authority of the copyright proprietor.”
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 10 in 1947,
repealed 1978). It was unclear what the effect was of publication without notice when the initial
publication occurred in a foreign country. For a discussion of this ambiguity and its effect on
copyright restoration, see Ochoa, supra note 21, at 295–97, 303–05, 308–10.
113. Before the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act, the 1976 Act
required notice be placed “[w]henever a work . . . is published in the United States or elsewhere.”
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 401(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2576.
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Virginia Woolf, paintings by Pablo Picasso (including Guernica),
drawings of M.C. Escher, and innumerable photographs.114
The third subcategory consists of nondramatic literary works in
the English language published between January 1, 1923, and July 1,
1986, that were not manufactured in the United States.115 Since most
major publishers complied with the manufacturing clause when it was
operative, this subcategory includes far fewer works than the other
two. Moreover, foreign publishers of English-language works could
deposit a foreign edition for ad interim protection and then register
the American edition when it was published.116 However, if the ad
interim copyright expired before an American edition was published,
the work entered the public domain and was eligible for copyright
restoration.117
The second category consists of sound recordings from all
eligible countries that were fixed before February 15, 1972 (the date
sound recordings became eligible for federal copyright protection),118
and that were not in the public domain in their source countries on
114. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 82–83, 88; PUBLIC DOMAIN SHERPA, supra note
111.
115. The 1909 Act required that all English-language books and periodicals be printed and
bound within the United States, from type set within the United States, or by engraving or
lithography done within the United States, with certain exceptions. Copyright Act of 1909, ch.
320, § 15, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 16 in 1947, repealed 1978).
The 1976 Act required that copies of nondramatic literary works in English be manufactured in
either the United States or Canada, with certain exceptions, with a sunset date of July 1, 1982.
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 601, 90 Stat. 2541, 2588. The sunset date was extended to July 1, 1986, by
Pub. L. No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 178 (1982). The expired provision was finally repealed in 2010.
Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-295, § 4(a), 124
Stat. 3180, 3180.
116. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 21–22, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 22–23 in 1947, repealed 1978). As originally enacted, the foreign edition had to be
deposited within thirty days of publication in the foreign country, and the ad interim copyright
lasted only thirty days, which did not provide enough time to get a new edition published in the
United States. Id. § 21. In 1919, Congress amended the statute to provide that the foreign
edition could be deposited within sixty days of the foreign publication, and the ad interim
copyright would last for four months. Pub. L. No. 66-102, 41 Stat. 368, 369. In 1949, Congress
again amended the statute to provide that the foreign edition could be deposited within six
months of the foreign publication, and the ad interim copyright would last for five years. Pub. L.
No. 81-84, §2, 63 Stat. 153, 154 (codified at former 17 U.S.C. § 22, repealed 1978). In the 1976
Act, Congress eliminated ad interim protection and instead gave an alleged infringer a defense if
foreign-made copies were imported or distributed by the copyright owner in violation of the
manufacturing clause and the infringing copies were manufactured in the United States or
Canada. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 601(d), 90 Stat 2541, 2589 (repealed 2010).
117. According to one scholar, the combination of the ad interim provisions and copyright
“has made it almost impossible to determine with certainty whether a book published in the
United States after 1922 and before 1964 is in the public domain.” Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright
Renewal, Copyright Restoration, and the Difficulty of Determining Copyright Status, D-LIB MAG.,
(July/Aug. 2008), http://www.dlib.org/dlib/july08/hirtle/07hirtle.html.
118. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2006).
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January 1, 1996.119 In most countries, sound recordings are not
protected by “copyright,” or author’s rights, but are instead accorded
protection under so-called “neighboring rights.”120 Indeed, sound
recordings are not protected under the Berne Convention, but are
instead the subject of a separate treaty, the Rome Convention, to
which the United States is not a party.121 The United States, however,
is a party to the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms,122 as well as the TRIPS Agreement and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”).123 Under the Rome Convention and the
Geneva Convention, sound recordings are protected for a minimum of
only twenty years from the date of fixation (for Rome) or the date of
first publication (for Geneva).124 However, under the TRIPS
Agreement, sound recordings are protected for at least fifty years from
the date of fixation;125 and under the WPPT, sound recordings are
protected for at least fifty years from the date of first publication, if
they are published within fifty years of fixation.126 Thus, sound
recordings from most foreign countries are eligible if they were fixed
(or published) between January 1, 1946, and February 14, 1972.127

119. Id. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(ii).
120. See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 13, § 2.2.2, at 22; 2 SAM RICKETSON & JANE
C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION
AND BEYOND §§ 19.01–19.04, at 1205–10 (2d ed. 2006) (introducing the background and
development of the “neighbouring right” concept).
121. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html [hereinafter Rome Convention];
Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=17 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing contracting parties
to the Rome Convention).
122. See Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 888 U.N.T.S. 67, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/phonograms/trtdocs_wo023.html
[hereinafter
Geneva
Convention]; Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=18 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing
contracting parties to the Geneva Convention).
123. See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html [hereinafter
WPPT]; Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=20 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (listing contracting
parties to the WPPT).
124. Rome Convention, supra note 121, art. 14; Geneva Convention, supra note 122, art. 4.
125. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, art. 14(5).
126. WPPT, supra note 123, art. 17(2).
127. If the source country protects sound recordings for fifty years rather than twenty years,
then a sound recording fixed or published in its source country in 1946 or later would not be in
the public domain in its source country on January 1, 1996, the date of restoration.
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This category includes such important sound recordings as all of the
recordings of the Beatles, Tommy by The Who, early recordings by Led
Zeppelin (“Stairway to Heaven”), the Rolling Stones, and Pink Floyd,
and the best-selling classical album of all time, a complete recording of
Wagner’s four-opera Ring of the Nibelungen cycle, conducted by Georg
Solti.128 As of January 1, 1996, these foreign sound recordings received
federal copyright protection in the United States for the first time.129
However, this category of works cannot truly be said to have been
“removed” from the public domain. This is because federal copyright
law does not (and will not) preempt state-law protection for sound
recordings until February 15, 2067,130 and most states likely will
protect foreign as well as domestic sound recordings under their
common law.131 Thus, intentionally or not, section 514 arguably
resulted in these foreign sound recordings having both state and
federal protection. If the Supreme Court holds that section 514 is
unconstitutional, these sound recordings will remain protected (and
therefore out of the public domain) as a matter of state law. In other
words, for this category, the decision in Golan will have no practical
effect.
The third category consists of works from those eligible
countries with whom the United States did not have any copyright
relations until sometime after January 1, 1923, and that were not in
the public domain in their source countries on January 1, 1996.132
While the United States has long had copyright treaty relations with
its major trading partners in Western Europe and Latin America,133
this category includes all works published (after 1922) in Russia and
128. See NORMAN LEBRECHT, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF CLASSICAL MUSIC: FEATURING THE
100 BEST AND 20 WORST RECORDINGS EVER MADE 136, 209–11 (2007) (describing Solti’s
eighteen-million-selling recording).
129. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (2006).
130. Id. § 301(c).
131. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 265 (N.Y. 2005)
(holding that all sound recordings are entitled to perpetual protection under New York common
law until federal preemption occurs, even if they are in the public domain in their country of
origin).
132. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B), (h)(6)(C)(iii) (2006).
133. The United States established bilateral copyright relations with Belgium, France, the
United Kingdom, and Switzerland on July 1, 1891, with Germany on April 15, 1892, with Italy
on October 31, 1892, with Spain on July 10, 1895, with Mexico on February 27, 1896, with Chile
on May 25, 1896, with Costa Rica on October 18, 1899, with Japan on May 10, 1906, with
Canada on January 1, 1924, and with Argentina on August 23, 1934. The United States joined
the Buenos Aires Convention effective July 13, 1914, through which copyright relations were
established with Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay before 1923,
and with Colombia on December 23, 1936. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 38A:
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 2–10 (2010).

Ochoa__Page.doc (Do Not Delete)

2011]

AN INTRODUCTION TO GOLAN V. HOLDER

10/3/11 2:39 PM

143

the countries of the former Soviet Union before May 27, 1973;134 in the
People’s Republic of China before March 17, 1992;135 in Hong Kong
before August 1, 1973;136 in Singapore before May 18, 1987;137 in South
Korea before October 1, 1987;138 in North Korea before April 28,
2003;139 and in Turkey and the former Yugoslavian states before
March 1, 1989,140 among other countries. Important works in this
category include most of the works of twentieth century Russian
composers Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitri Shostakovich, and Igor
Stravinsky,141 and Russian films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s The
Battleship Potemkin and Alexander Nevsky.142
The immediate effect of Golan will be to determine whether all
of these works (and thousands of others) validly had their copyrights
restored in 1996, or whether they are all (once again) in the public
domain in the United States. The long-term impact of the opinion,
however, may be even greater.

134. Id. at 9, 11 n.2.
135. Id. at 3, 11 nn.5–6.
136. Id. at 4, 11 n.13.
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. Because North Korea joined the Berne Convention after 1996, the effective date of
copyright protection for preexisting works would be the date of its accession (Apr. 28, 2003). 17
U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(B) (2006).
140. The former Yugoslavian states are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 133, at 3, 5, 8–9. Both
Turkey and Yugoslavia were members of the Berne Convention before the United States joined.
See id. at 9 (Turkey); World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Notification No. 75,
Ratification by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Paris Act (1971), June 2, 1975,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/berne/treaty_berne_75.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2011). Hence, works published in these countries after the United States joined
the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989, are not in the public domain and did not need to be
restored.
141. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 68, ¶¶ 56, 66, 69–71, 76.
142. These films were first published in 1925 and 1938, respectively. See www.imdb.com/
title/tt0015648 and www.imdb.com/title/tt0029850. In 1925, the former Soviet Union had a
copyright term of twenty-five years from first publication, which was increased to life of the
author plus fifteen years in 1928, and to life of the author plus twenty-five years in 1973. See
MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION 74–76, 81–83 (2005). Eisenstein died in 1948, and because the 1973 law was not
retroactive, id. at 527, these films were in the public domain in the Soviet Union from 1964
onward. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the Russian Federation enacted a new
copyright law in 1993 that has a duration of life of the author plus fifty years. Id. at 393, 436.
Because the 1993 law was retroactive, id. at 525–35 (analyzing the problem and concluding that
retroactive application was intended), the films were no longer in the public domain in Russia on
January 1, 1996, the date of restoration.
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B. Future Implications
Ultimately, what is at stake in Golan is nothing less than the
entire corpus of works in the public domain, and even the entire
concept of a public domain. If the Court holds that the Patent and
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment prohibits removal of
material from the public domain, then the public domain will indeed
be irrevocable, and the public will have a bright-line constitutional
safeguard against future incursions by Congress.143 If the Court holds
that material may be removed from the public domain, but only for
specified reasons or only within certain limits, then any future
congressional action regarding the public domain will at least be
subject to constitutional challenge. But if the Court holds that
Congress has the discretion to remove material from the public
domain whenever it chooses, the potential future consequences will be
staggering.
If Congress can validly take any work out of the public domain
and put it back under copyright protection, then there is nothing to
keep Congress from taking all works out of the public domain and
putting them back under copyright protection. The works of
Shakespeare, Beethoven, Jane Austen, Mark Twain, and millions of
other long-deceased authors could be privatized and become the
private property of a particular publisher,144 just as they were before
the House of Lords’ landmark decision in Donaldson v. Becket,145
which recognized the public domain for the first time in AngloAmerican jurisprudence.146 Moreover, the “limited Times” restriction
in the Patent and Copyright Clause will be rendered a dead letter. In

143. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01618.pdf (“Question [Justice Souter]: If the equity argument under the Necessary and Proper
Clause justifies extension of the copyright for those whose copyright will expire tomorrow if it's
not extended, in order to put them on parity with those getting copyrights for new works, why
doesn't it apply to the copyright, the holder of the copyright that expired yesterday? General
Olson [for the Government]: You could arguably—you could conceivably make that argument,
Justice Souter, but there is a bright line there. Something that has already gone into the public
domain, which other individuals or companies or entities may then have acquired an interest in,
or rights to, or be involved in disseminating . . . .”).
144. See id. at 29–30 (“Question [Justice Breyer]: [I]f Congress tomorrow wants to give a
copyright to a publisher solely for the purpose of reproducing and disseminating Ben Jonson,
Shakespeare, it can do it? General Olson [for the Government]: It may . . . . I don't think there is
a per se rule that should apply here because this is a grant of Congress, to Congress to exercise
its judgment as to what may be beneficial.”).
145. [1774] 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
146. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 223–24; Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly
Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675, 682–84 (2002).
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Eldred, the majority responded to the argument that copyright term
extension would effectively allow “perpetual copyright on the
installment plan”147 by stating that there was no evidence that
Congress was attempting to protect copyrights in perpetuity.148 But if
Congress can restore copyrights, there is no need for copyright term
extension: Congress can simply allow the “limited Times” to expire
and then restore the copyrights in the works for another “limited
Time” the following day.
Perhaps these scenarios seem far-fetched—although in a
political system that relies on checks and balances, we should be loath
to accept that nothing more than congressional forbearance and good
sense will protect the public domain from significant depletion. But
there is one scenario that is anything but far-fetched: if the Court
upholds copyright restoration for foreign works, and the opinion in
any way states or implies that failure to comply with the “formalities”
formerly imposed under U.S. law does not irrevocably place works into
the public domain in a way that implicates the Constitution, then
Congress will come under tremendous pressure from domestic
copyright owners to give them the benefit of the same bargain that
was given to foreign copyright owners in 1996. Domestic copyright
owners will cry that it is “unfair” to give significant benefits of
copyright restoration to foreign copyright owners without affording
the same benefit to U.S. copyright owners, and domestic reliance
parties will be hard-pressed to explain why the line should be drawn
here. The result will very likely be that the eighty-five to ninety
percent of all works that were not renewed between 1923 and 1963,
and the tens of thousands of works that were published without
proper copyright notice, will once again be placed under copyright
protection. The temptations for putative copyright owners to earn
monopoly profits are simply too great. Public choice theory suggests
that a small minority with a lot of money to gain will consistently be
more successful in lobbying Congress than a diffuse majority that will

147. Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 303 (1996). The phrase
originated in Jaszi’s testimony to Congress in 1995. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 73 (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi,
Professor, American University Washington College of Law).
148. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208–10 (2003). But see id. at 242 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] categorical rule prohibiting retroactive extensions would effectively preclude
perpetual copyrights. More importantly, . . . unless the Clause is construed to embody such a
categorical rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the
majority's analysis.”); Ochoa, supra note 40, at 45 & n.150 (quoting Rep. Mary Bono, who
expressly sought a copyright term of “forever less one day”).
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each lose only a small amount of money with each transaction,149 even
though the net result will be a congressional giveaway of billions of
dollars of public property to private ownership.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the first two hundred years of our history, copyright was a
relatively short-term proposition: some works entered the public
domain immediately upon publication, if the author or publisher failed
to comply with the prescribed statutory formalities; the vast majority
of works entered the public domain after only fourteen or twenty-eight
years; and a small percentage of financially lucrative works were
renewed and received a total of twenty-eight, forty-two, or fifty-six
years of copyright protection before entering the public domain.150
Each year, the public received the benefit of new works entering the
public domain, where they would remain irrevocably.151 Today,
copyright lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years—likely
three or four generations for most works.152 Virtually no one will live
to see the favorite works of their childhood enter the public domain,
and no published works will enter the public domain again until
2019.153 Indeed, the very notion of the public domain as a repository of
works existing for the benefit of the public is under attack.
In Golan v. Holder, the plaintiffs are challenging only one piece
of Congress’s assault on the public domain: the grant or restoration of
copyright protection to foreign works that were previously in the
public domain. The Supreme Court will decide whether the public
domain will remain irrevocable and inviolate, or whether it exists only
at the whim and forbearance of Congress and can be taken away from
the public and privatized at any time.

149. On public choice theory as applied to copyright, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright
Duration: Theories and Practice, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 133,
138 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
150. The 1790 Act had a fourteen-year term, renewable once; the 1831 Act had a twentyeight-year initial term, with a fourteen-year renewal term; and the 1909 Act had a twenty-eightyear term, renewable once. Ochoa, supra note 40, at 29–32, 38–39. See also supra notes 17–22,
40–41 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
153. See supra note 58.

